Fiscal deficit reduction programs in developing countries: Stabilization versus growth in the presence of credit rationing by John T. Cuddington
FISCAL DEFICIT REDUCTION PROGRAMS IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: STABILIZATION 
VERSUS GROWTH IN THE PRESENCE OF 
CREDIT RATIONING * 
JohnT.Cuddington 
Georgetown University 
Resu men: Este artículo analiza los conflictos potenciales entre 
efectos a corto plazo sobre el producto y el empleo 
y efectos a mediano plazo sobre el crecimiento de 
varias políticas fiscales. En el modelo, las empresas 
y los hogares son optimizadores intertemporales; 
la inflexibilidad en el corto plazo de los salarios 
junto con el control sobre las tasas de interés 
generan desequilibrios mácroeconómicos. El 
análisis se centra en las consecuencias de varias 
políticas de gasto público y de reducción del déficit. 
Abstract: This paper presents a model for analyzing 
potential conflicts between short-run output 
and employment effects and medium-run 
growth effects of various fiscal actions. In the 
model, both firms and households are intertem-
poral optimizers; short-run wage stickiness and 
interest rate controls generate macroeconomic 
disequilibrium. The analysis focuses on the con-
sequences of various government expenditure 
or deficit reduction policies. 
In the 1980s, many developing countries initiated fiscal deficit or government 
expenditure reduction programs -either at their own initiative or as part of 
IMF Standby Agreements or World Bank adjustment programs. The Baker 
Initiative (of 1985) renewed interest in the medium-term growth consequences 
of these policies, which had been over-shadowed by short-run stabilization 
objectives as the debt crisis emerged in the early 1980s. 
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The purpose of this paper is to present a stylized model for analyzing 
potential conflicts between short-run output and employment effects and 
medium-run growth effects of various fiscal actions in LDCs suffering from 
classical unemployment and credit rationing. In the model, financial inter-
mediation occurs via a regulated banking system rather than bond and equity 
markets. Both firms and households are intertemporal optimizers who un-
derstand the future consequences of current policy changes. Short-run wage 
stickiness and interest rate controls on both borrowing and lending rates 
(coupled with high reserve requirements) generate macroeconomic disequi-
librium. The analysis here focuses on the disequilibrium regime where there 
is credit rationing and classical (rather than Keynesian) unemployment 
In addition to domestic credit rationing, the country is assumed to face a 
foreign borrowing constraint. Any available foreign credit goes to the govern-
ment sector.
1 
From an analytical standpoint, our framework contains a number of 
noteworthy features. First, credit market distortions cause debt and tax finance 
of a given level of government spending to have different effects. That is, 
Barro-Ricardian debt neutrality does not hold in our model, even though the 
household's intertemporal budget constraint can be written in a form usually 
thought to imply Ricardian equivalence. Second, the model provides an addi-
tional way of introducing money into a "microfoundations" macro model so that 
both money-financed and debt-financed fiscal deficits can be considered. Stand-
ard approaches put money directly into households' utility functions or impose 
a cash-in-advance constraint on household purchases. Our set-up assumes that 
commercial banks, not households, have a demand for high-powered money due 
to the minimum reserve requirements imposed by bank regulators.
2 
Third, the paper incorporates Erling Steigum's (1983) insight that classi-
cal unemployment, characterized by a notional excess demand for goods, can 
prevail even if the price of current output is assumed to be flexible upwards.
3 
He showed that classical unemployment occurs in intertemporal disequi-
librium models when the current real wages are fixed too high and the real 
interest rate is fixed below its market-clearing level.
4 Classical unemploy-
' The model is unchanged if the country does not face a foreign borrowing 
constraint but instead its government imposes controls on capital account transactions. 
2 Ideally, the model should be extended to incorporate both household and 
commercial bank demands for high-powered money. 
3 Some critics of the fix-price regimes described by Barro and Crossman (1976) or 
Malinvaud (1977) conclude that classical unemployment is likely to be uncommon in 
practice because it presumes that current output prices that fail to rise in response to an 
excess demand for goods. They find upward stickiness of prices much less plausible than 
downward stickiness. 
4 Steigum's model is a barter model. Ours allows for money holdings. FISCAL DEFICIT REDUCTION PROGRAMS 33 
ment in this set-up is associated with a shortage of capital, a common situation 
in many developing countries. 
Section 1 specifies the behavior of the banking sector, households, firms, 
the government, and the foreign sector. The economy's equilibrium condi-
tions for the non-Walrasian equilibrium (or "disequilibrium") regime where 
there is short-run classical unemployment and credit rationing are presented 
in Section 2.
5 The equilibrium is illustrated using a simple diagram to facilitate 
(comparative static) policy analysis. Section 3 analyzes the short-run effects 
of various fiscal policy changes on credit availability, prices, output, and 
employment, as well as their medium-term effects on future output via saving 
and investment. Policy effects on national welfare are considered in Section 
4. Section 5 concludes. 
1. Analytical Framework 
The analytical framework used here is the familiar two-period set-up where 
disequilibrium exists in the short-run (represented by period 1) due to wage 
and interest rate rigidities, while Walrasian equilibrium prevails in the long 
run (i.e. period 2).
6 Both households and firms optimize over the two-period 
horizon under the assumption of perfect foresight. 
1.1. Households 
Households maximize an intertemporal utility function that depends on 
current and future consumption and separably on government expenditures: 
f/(C, C) + v(G, G'). Throughout the paper, the prime (') superscript denotes 
second-period variables. Households receive income from three sources: i) 
labor employment, ii) firms' profits, which are distributed in the period when 
earned, and in) interest on bank deposits and profits from banks' period-1 
lending activity, nB. These profits aredistributed to households at the beginning 
of period 2 when loans are repaid. Nominal wealth, therefore, equals: 
W=(PY-T) + (\ +idr
l [p'Y'-L (1 + i) + nB-T'] . (1.1) 
5 Other regimes exist, as the literature on disequilibrium macroeconomics makes 
clear; see Cuddington et al. (1984) for a review and detailed discussion of open-economy 
disequilibrium models. To avoid being taxonomic, this paper focuses on a particular 
regime, which is especially relevant in many LDCs. 
6 This set-up is similar to other two-period models in the literature; see, e.g., 
Persson (1982), Neary and Sriglitz (1983), and Cuddington-Vinals (1986a,b). Compared 
to a multi-period, infinite-horizon framework, it has the advantage of analytical trac-
tability. 34 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
where pY and p'Y'-L (1+/) represent the firms' total wage and profit 
income in periods 1 and 2, net of the cost of repaying loans in the second 
period. T and T are current and future taxes. All household savings are 
assumed to be held in the form of bank deposits, which yield the regulated 
(sub-market) interest rate id. So 1 / (1 + id) is the nominal discount factor. 
Utility maximization yields a standard demand for current consumption: 
C = C(p,p'/(l + id),W) (1.2) 
where C < 0, C > 0,0 < Cw < 1. The consumption function is homogeneous 
of degree zero in the nominal arguments. The signs of the partial derivatives 
assume that current and future output are gross substitutes. For convenience, 
8d = p' I (1 + id) is taken as the households' numeraire and set equal to unity 
in what follows. The demand for bank deposits, i.e. nominal saving, equals: 
D=pY-T-pC(p, W) . (1.3) 
1.2. Firms 
Firms choose employment E and investment / to maximize the present value 
of cash flows, using the prevailing loan rate of interest /' as the discount rate. 
In the absence of credit rationing, this yields standard labor and investment 
demand functions: 
E = E{wlp), E'<0 (1.4) 
l = I(pl 5), /'>0 (1.5) 
where w is the sticky nominal wage in period 1 and 5 = p' I (1 +,) present-value 
price of second-period output from the firms' perspective.
7 Substituting these 
factor demands into the first and second-period production functions yields 
output supply functions in periods 1 and 2 respectively:
8 
Y=Y(wlp) (1.6) 
Y'=Y'(plb). (1.7) 
7 For simplicity, w is assumed to be fixed. The analysis below goes through if w is a 
positively related to the price level, i.e. w = w(p), as long as the elasticity is less than unity. 
8 Assuming full employment and an inelastic supply of labor in the second period 
obviates the need to treat the labor market at t = 2 explicitly. Alternatively, the assump-
tion of full wage indexation in the long run would accomplish this. FISCAL DEFICIT REDUCTION PROGRAMS 35 
Assuming all investment is financed by bank loans,
9 the firm's notional 
demand for credit is derived directly from investment demand (2.5): 
Lp=pl(p/8). (1.8) 
1.3. Credit Rationing Case 
In situations where firms face a binding credit constraint L, private investment is 
limited to: 
7=1/p . (1.9) 
The tilde (-)on J denotes the effective (as opposed to notional) demand 
for investment goods, given the borrowing constraint L, which is en-
dogenously determined below. The presence of credit-rationing causes the 
effective level of future output Y to lie below the unconstrained profit-max-
imizing level: 
?'= ?'(/)< Y'(l(pl 6)) . (1.10) 
This implies that the present value of firms' profits (i.e. the value of the firm) 
depends positively on credit availability and hence on effective invest-
ment.
1
0 
1.4. H/c Public Sector 
The government purchases output in each period (G , G') and finances these 
expenditures by some combination of: i) lump-sum taxation in each period, 
T and T, ii) loans from the banking system in period 1, denoted L , 
Hi) foreign borrowing (F, in foreign currency units), to the extent that foreign 
loans are available, and iv) issuing non-interest-bearing debt to the central 
" It would be interesting to allow for retained earnings as a way of financing 
investment. In fact, thereis a clear incentive for firms to use retained earnings: when the 
deposit rate is fixed below the rate firms are willing to pay for loans, both firms and 
households can be made better off if firms retain and reinvest earnings. This presumes, 
of course, that firms and households can avoid the government-distorted banking 
system altogether. Furthermore, it ignores the question of how retained earnings of 
various firms get (efficiently) allocated among firms with profitable investment projects. 
1
0 In the absence of credit rationing, the firm chooses the optimal level of I. The envelope 
theorem insures that the partial derivative of the value of the firm with respect to I is zero 
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bank, which in turn issues high-powered money, H. Hence, the government's 
financing constraints are: 
pG = T + Lg + H + p(Flp*) (1.11a) 
p'G' = T'-Lg(\ + i) -p'F(l + f) /p*' . (1.11b) 
Note that printing money in the second period (//') is not an option; the only 
demand for high-powered money arises in the first period when commercial 
banks are carrying out financial intermediation and must meet legal reserve 
requirements. In period 2, when no saving or investment occurs, banks are 
unwillingly to accept high-powered money from the government. 
In the comparative static analysis below, current and future taxes are 
treated as endogenous. The government chooses real spending, borrow-
ing, and money creation; the financing constraints in (1.11) are then used 
to solve out for T and T in the households' wealth constraint (1.1). This 
yields: 
W = p(X-G-l)+bd(Y'-G') + PF, (1.12) 
where 
,/> />' l+i*  
P_P* \ + id P*' ' 
The asterisks (*) on p and / indicate foreign-currency prices and interest 
rates. Note that apart from the last term in (1.12),
1
1 which of course disap-
pears when F = 0 or p = 0, the expression for wealth takes the familiar form 
found in two-period models exhibiting Ricardian equivalence between 
(lump-sum) tax finance and debt finance of a given level of government 
spending. Nevertheless, it is shown below that there is a breakdown of 
Ricardian equivalence in the present model when credit rationing occurs.
1
2 
" The last term reflects the welfare gain (loss) on foreign borrowing by the 
government when the real interest factor on foreign borrowing p"lp'(l+i') is less 
(greater) than the real domestic interest factor p' I p( 1 + i ). When the open interest parity 
condition holds, p = 0. 
1
2 The fact that wealth can be written as (1.12) even though Ricardian debt neutrality 
does not prevail suggests that empirical tests of the proposition based on the sign and 
significance of (Y-G) and (Y'-G') in the aggregate consumption function may be 
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1.5. The Foreign Sector 
It is assumed that the country under consideration faces credit rationing not 
only in the domestic market (as a result of the interest rate controlsit imposes), 
but also in the international market. The country faces a foreign borrowing 
constraint F and all available credit goes to the government. The country's 
international budget constraint then implies a net export surplus of 
F (1 + ;'*) / p'* in the future in order to service the debt. (The possibility of debt 
repudiation in ignored.) 
To simplify the characterization of goods market equilibrium below, it 
will be assumed that domestic and foreign goods are perfect substitutes. In 
the absence of restrictions on international transactions in goods and financial 
capital, arbitrage would insure that the law of one price held in each period; 
i.e./) = ep* and p' = e'p*' where e is the exchange rate, p* and p'* are exogenous 
foreign prices, reflecting our small country assumption. Although such ar-
bitrage is assumed to occur in the long run so that p' = e'p*', foreign exchange 
constraints prevent arbitrage in the short run. Via the balance of payments 
accounting identity, the foreign borrowing constraint in effect places a quan-
titative limit on net imports M in period 1: 
lM = F/p* 
The country would like to import more if more foreign credit was available. 
Thus, in the absence of arbitrage the domestic price of current output p will 
lie above the price on the world market p*. p I p* can be interpreted as the 
shadow exchange rate. In this situation, economic rent accrues to those who 
are allowed to import goods at price p* for resale in the domestic market at 
price p. In deriving (1.11) above, it was assumed that the government secures 
this rent by selling import licenses. In the second period, the government 
repays the foreign currency loan by supplying/exporting real goods equal to 
F(l + /*) / p" to foreign creditors. 
1.6. The Banking Sector 
Banks collect deposits, D, from households in period 1 and make loans to 
private firms and the government, whose demands for credit are denoted 
L and L respectively. Several regulatory constraints affect banks. First, the 
interest rate on deposits id is assumed fixed and banks must accept all 
deposits forthcoming from households at that rate. Second, there are legal 
reserve requirements that banks hold a fraction a of total deposits (D) in the 
form of non-interest-bearing reserves. This creates a banking sector demand 
for high-powered money in period 1 equal to: 38 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
H
d = aD (1.13) 
In period 2, households do no saving and hence hold no bank deposits. 
Consequently, banks (as well as nonbanks) have no demand for high-
powered money. To close the present two-period model, it is assumed that 
banks hold forever the reserves required in period 1 (i.e. they are never 
distributed to households). This, of course, affects the cost of doing business 
in period 1.
1
3 Banks' objective is to choose the level of loansL so as to maximize 
profits after accounting for the cost of the reserves, H: 
nh = [(1 + i)U + H - (1 + id)D] - H 
subject to their balance sheet constraint (L + H = D) and the (1.13). 
Assuming banks continue to operate even if they make losses (which 
would occur if (1 + 0 (1 - a) < (1 + /d)), banks will wish to remain fully loaned 
up.
1
4 Therefore, the notional supply of loans is:
1
5 
L'=(l-a)D, (1.14) 
yielding profits equal to: 
nB = [(1 + /') (1 - a) - (1 + id)] D . (1.15) 
These profits are distributed to households at the beginning of period 2. 
The nature of the credit market disequilibrium when interest rates are 
administratively fixed depends on the gap lending and deposit rates and 
the size of reserve requirements, among other things. This paper focuses 
on the common situation where there is credit rationing or a "capital 
1
3 An alternative but mathematically equivalent way to dose the model is to assume 
that the government buys back high-powered money in the last period so that its period 
2 financing constraint in (1.11b) becomes: pG' + H = T'-L (l + i)-e'F(l +/•). In this 
case, bank profits equal Jta = (l + i)L' + H-(l + i.)D. The resulting expression for wealth 
is exactly the same as that specified in (1.12), so the comparative static results are 
identical to those reported in the text. 
1
4 This assumes that free exit from the banking sector is not permitted in the case 
where profits turn negative. It is not uncommon for governments -and not just LDC 
governments- to absorb bank losses in order to keep insolvent banks afloat. 
1
5 The notional loan supply is relevant as long as banks face an excess demand for 
loans. The discussion below makes clear that is possible to have fixed interest rate 
equilibria where banks have an excess supply of loans. FISCAL DEFICIT REDUCTION PROGRAMS 39 
shortage"
1
6 and government demand for credit is satisfied first. The remain-
ing credit is available for private firms: 
L = L
S-Lg. (1.16) 
This will imply direct crowding out of private investment when government 
demand for credit from the financial system is increased. Different rationing 
rules would, of course, lead to different conclusions. 
Even though both deposit and lending rates are fixed, credit rationing 
need not prevail. In order to get a credit rationing equilibrium, the gap 
between / and id must be positive, but not "too large". The intuitive reason 
for this can be shown using the partial equilibrium perspective of Figure 1. If 
the deposit rate is fixed at id, the demand for deposits (saving) by households 
(1.3) will result in banks supplying loans of L (from (1.14) and (1.16)) to the 
private sector. As long as the lending rate /' is fixed at a level below i*\ the 
demand for loanable funds by firms will exceed L, leading to credit rationing. 
Figure 1 
Credit Rationing: A Partial Equilibrium Perspective 
Interest 
rates 
id 
1
6 It is, of course, possible to use the model to study the situation where the lending 
rate is allowed to adjust freely to equate demand for loans to the credit-constrained supply. 
This rate is shown by /" in Figure 1. As long as the deposit rate is fixed by regulators, the 
equilibrium loan rate (1 +/') need not equal 1 +/.) / (1 - a). The latter would be the 
competitive equilibrium loan rate in the presence of reserve requirements when both 
deposit and loan rates are free to adjust. Jtfl equals zero in this case, as (1.15) readily confirms. 40 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
If, in contrast, / is fixed above f * and banks are not allowed to refuse depo-
sits at td, they would be unable to make enough loans to remain fully loaned up. 
Actual reserves would exceed the legally required level in (1.13). This particular 
financial market disequilibrium regime is not discussed further here. 
2. Short-Run Unemployment Equilibrium 
This section provides a tractable characterization of the case where there is 
credit rationing coupled with classical unemployment. The impacts of 
various policy changes on short-run employment/output and growth (via 
saving and investment) are then determined.
1
7 
Equating the policy-determined supply of high-powered money, H, to 
the derived demand for reserves by commercial banks yields the money market 
equilibrium condition: 
H = aD (2.1) 
where D is defined in (1.3). 
In the present model, commercial banks act solely as a conduit between 
household saving and aggregate (private plus public) demand for credit. 
Furthermore, only commercial banks demand high-powered money. Hence, 
the money market equilibrium condition can be replaced by a credit market 
equilibrium condition. This is done by using the commercial bank balance sheet 
identity and the demand for base money in (1.13) to write the supply of loans 
in (1.14) as a function of base money: 
L* = (1 - a)D = [(1 - a) I a]H . (2.2) 
1
7 To facilitate an intuitive understanding of the model, it may be helpful to 
consider what happens in the neoclassical case where prices, wages, and both deposit 
and loan rates of interest are flexible, so that continuous market-clearing prevails. In 
this case, wage-price flexibility keeps outputYatits (exogenous) full-employment level 
and the goods market equilibrium condition alone determines the real interest factor 
p'!p(\ + i) = (l-a)p'/P{\ + id). The wedge between the deposit and lending rates 
reflects the distortion caused by reserve requirements. Using the equilibrium real 
interest rate, the bank credit market equilibrium condition or more typically (but 
equivalently) the money market equilibrium condition -determines the price level. The 
fact that p is determined recursively indicates that the classical dichotomy prevails in 
this version of the model. When the wage rate and the deposit rate are sticky, on the 
other hand, the classical dichotomy breaks down: the real interest factor p' I p (1 + i) and 
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When interest rate ceilings on deposits depress national saving relative 
to the demand for loans at the regulated lending rate, an excess demand for 
credit results. Given our assumption that government demand for credit gets 
priority, the credit market equilibrium in the presence of rationing equals: 
pl=L=\(\- a)! a]H - Lg . (2.3) 
As both / and p are endogenous, (2.3) determines the credit-constrained level 
of nominal investment expenditure by firms as a function of the various 
policies impacting credit availability: a, H, and L 
Given the stickiness of interest rates and wages, output prices are as-
sumed to adjust to equate the effective aggregate demand for output to output 
supply. Hence, the goods market equilibrium under rationing is: 
Y(w,p) = C(p, W)+T+ G-F/p* . (2.4) 
Because 7 is effective demand, wealth is reduced below the level it attains 
when investment is not credit-constrained: 
W = p(Y-G-T)+5jYXT)-G'] + VF . (2.5) 
Together (2.3), (2.4), and (2.5) determine the price level p and the effective 
level of investment 7. 
The credit-rationed, underemployment equilibrium is depicted 
diagrammatically in Figure 2. The LL locus is the rectangular hyperbole 
showing (p, 7) combinations that satisfy the credit constraint (2.3) for given 
values of H, a, and L Increases in H and decreases in a or L cause an increase 
in the supply of credit, shifting the LL locus to the right. The GG locus denotes 
goods market equilibrium found by substituting (2.5) into (2.4). (Appendix 1 
confirms that the slope of GG is unambiguously positive.) Intuitively, an 
increase in 7 raises aggregate demand, both directly and indirectly via its 
positive wealth effect on consumption. These increases in / must be accom-
panied by higher output prices ceteris paribus to maintain goods market 
equilibrium. Increases in G shift the GG locus downward to the right, reflect-
ing the fact that, at any arbitrarily chosen level of 7, an increase in government 
spending necessitates a rise in output prices to restore goods market equi-
librium. 
Besides characterizing the equilibrium (/>,/), Figure 2 clearly shows 
potential trade-offs or complementarities between policies' short-run 
stabilization effects and their effects on medium-term growth. Stabilization 
impacts are proxied by p, on the horizontal axis, because increases (decreases) 
in p raise (lower) current output Y(w,p) and, hence, employment. Medium-42 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
term growth objectives are captured by J, on the vertical axis, because higher 
investment leads directly to higher future output, Y' (7). 
Figure 2 
Credit Rationing Equlibrium 
P 
3. Government Expenditure and Deficit Reduction Programs 
The foregoing model can be used to analyze the short and medium-term 
consequences of various government expenditure or deficit reduction 
programs in developing countries where unemployment and credit rationing 
prevail. Below, the following policy options are considered: 
i) a reduction in current .government spending accompanied by equal 
reduction in taxes, 
ii) announcements of future expenditure cuts, but no immediate cut, 
Hi) postponement rather than cancellation of major expenditure programs, 
iv) a reduction in inflationary finance, i.e. government demand for credit 
from the central bank, made possible by an increase in taxes, 
v) a reduction in government credit from the commercial banking system, 
financed by a tax increase. 
An analysis of the last policy allows us to demonstrate the failure to Ricardian 
equivalence (between government borrowing from the private sector and 
taxation) in our model -an implication that seems reasonable in the presence of 
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current output (and hence the level of output and employment), credit 
availability, and investment (and hence future output or "growth"), which 
are discussed in turn below, are summarized in Table 1 for easeof comparison. 
Table 1 
The Shord and Medium-Term Impact of Fiscal Policies in the 
Presence of Unemployment and Credit Rationing: 
Summary of the Text Discussion 
D
PY 
Balanced-Budget Reductions in 
Government Spending 
dG < 0, (Option 1) 
dG'<0, (Option 2) 
Postponing Government Spending 
dG<0 with dG' = -dG (Option 3) 
Tax Increases 
dT = -DLg>0 (Option 4) 
aT = -dLg>0 (Option 5) 
Changing the Method of Deficit Finance 
dH = -dL >0 
7 
+ 
0 
+  + 
+  + 
Notation Summary: 
G,G'= current/future government spending 
T, r= current/future lump-sum taxes 
H = high-powered money; issued as the central bank extends credit to the government 
L, = government credit from the commercial banking system 
p = price of current output 
r"(«*,/>)cun-ent output 
£(w,p) = current employment 
L = constraint on available credit 
/ = amount of capital investment 
Y = future output; proxying for economic growth 
Option V. A Balanced-Budget Reduction in Current Government Spending 
Consider, first, a temporary reduction in government expenditure accompanied 
by an equal tax reduction. From (2.4), it is clear that a cut in G (but not G') 
causes a reduction in aggregate demand, implying thatp must fall to restore 
equilibrium in the goods market. The GG curve in Figure 2 shifts to the left. 
Parenthetically, the reduction in G causes a less than peso-for-peso reduction 44 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
in aggregate demand because of the positive effect of lower current-period 
taxes on private wealth in (2.5). Both current consumption and saving for 
future consumption to rise, presuming that consumption in both periods are 
normal goods so that 3C / dW < 1. 
The fall in p as GG shifts to the left increases the real supply of bank credit 
lip in (2.5), thereby relaxing the credit-constraint on firms' capital invest-
ment. (The economy moves up along the LL curve in Figure 2). The new 
equilibrium is at point E2. The reduction in G causes a fall in p and a rise in 
investment. The fall in p implies a reduction in current output and employ-
ment. The rise in investment, on the other hand, causes the policy's medium-
term growth impact to be favorable. Policy makers contemplating a reduction 
in spending accompanied by tax increases must confront the trade-off be-
tween the adverse short-run employment effect and the favorable long-run 
effect on economic growth.
1
8 
Option 2: Announcing Future Expenditure Cuts 
Announcements of future government expenditure (C) cuts have a very 
different effect than the immediate but transitory cuts analyzed above. The 
impact effect of an anticipated reduction in G' is to fncrojseprivate wealth and 
hence private consumption; the GG curve shifts to the right. As p rises in 
response to the increase in aggregate demand, the real credit constraint (2.3) 
becomes tighter. Thus, the crowding-out of private investment intensifies, 
reducing medium-term growth. 
Comparing Options 1 and 2, it is clear that the effects on current and 
future output are reversed when the government announces future spending 
cuts rather than (temporarily) cutting expenditure today. Policy makers might 
consider announcing changes in future government spending at the same 
time that they cut current expenditures in an attempt to achieve an ap-
propriate balance between short-run employment and medium-term growth 
objectives. Needless to say, the more beneficial effects of future relative to current 
government spending and tax cuts rely on households being convinced that the 
government will actually follow through and cut spending in the future. 
Option 3: Postponing Current Government Expenditure 
Typically, governments resist permanent expenditure cuts. Instead they try 
to postpone current expenditures and make up for the austerity with higher 
'
8 One possible way to assess the attractiveness of this trade-off is to calculate the 
overall impact of the short and medium-term aspects of the policy on the representative 
household's utility index. This is pursued briefly in Section 4. FISCAL DEFICIT REDUCTION PROGRAMS 45 
expenditure in the future when the economic situation improves. Assuming 
this policy leaves the present value of government spending unchanged, its 
adverse short-term employment consequences (as p is forced down) will be 
more severe than those following the temporary cuts discussed in Option 1 
above. The reason for this is the following: the reduction in G still reduces 
aggregate demand, but there is no longer the partially offsetting increment 
to aggregate demand via private consumption, because private wealth 
remains constant under the present policy. Although the short-term un-
employment costs of this policy are higher than the temporary spending cut 
above, the beneficial medium-term growth impact is more favorable. 
Option 4: Reducing Central Bank Credit to the Government while Increasing Taxes 
When a government increases taxes, the need to borrow either from the 
central bank (i.e. "printing money") or the commercial banking system in 
order to fund a given level of government spending is reduced. The macro 
effects of the two options involving tax hikes are very different. If the 
government reduces high-powered money creation as taxes are increased, 
there are both short and long-run costs: current output and employment fall, 
as does capital investment and hence future output. To confirm these effects, 
note that the fall in // reduces the credit available for private investment L in 
(2.3), shifting the LL curve to the left. As aggregate demand falls, due to the 
impact of the credit crunch on investment, prices and hence current output 
and employment decline to restore goods market equilibrium. 
Option 5: Reducing Commercial Bank Credit to the Government while Increasing Taxes 
In contrast to the above analysis where the government was monetizing the 
deficit, a reduction in government borrowing from the commercial banking 
sector (L ) -facilitated by tax increases- will increase the bank credit available to 
private firms. This induces a rise in capital investment, as the LL curve shifts to 
the right. Both the rise in T , itself, and the resulting positive wealth effect on 
consumption cause aggregate demand to rise. Hence p must rise to restore 
equilibrium in the output market. In sum, if commercial bank credit to the 
government is reduced when taxes are raised, current output and future 
output will both rise}
9 
Unlike the other alternatives considered above, the fiscal reduction 
strategy that increases taxes so as to rely less heavily on commercial bank 
'» The favorable short-run output effect is exactly the opposite of the standard 
textbook conclusion based on ad hoc macro models which ignore intertemporal con-
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credit is "expansionary". It raises current and future output.
2
0 Thus, the 
Barro-Ricardian debt neutrality proposition does not hold in the present 
economic environment where banks face reserve requirements and regulated 
deposit rates. 
4. Welfare Analysis 
The policy analysis in the previous section discusses impacts on short-run 
stabilization -i.e. output and employment in period 1- and medium-term 
growth -measured by period 2 output. In some instances policies have 
favorable short-run effects but an adverse medium-term effects, or vice versa. 
In order to judge whether such policies are indeed welfare improving, one 
might consider the impact of policies on the utility index 
U(C, C) + v(G , G') of a representative household whose expenditure func-
tion takes the form: 
E=E(p,b~d,G , G' ,U) . (4.1) 
Gand G' are policy-chosen levelsof governmentgoodssupplied ata zero price 
to the private sector. Setting expenditure equal to wealth W and recalling 
that equilibrium values of(PJ,W) are determined by (2.3), (2.4) and (2.5), it 
is possible to solve for the impact of each policy on utility. 
Begin by totally differentiating the national budget constraint: 
E (p, 81, G , G', U) = p(Y-T- G) + 8,(7'- G') + fJF. (4.2) 
After noting that FIp* and, by market clearing, (7-G-/+/M) = 0 , this 
yields: 
EudU = (dY I dp)dp + [Sd dY' I dl- p]dl 
-l(p+ E)dG + (8, + Eg,)dG'] + P</F (4.3) 
The first term reflects the short-run stabilization impact of policies via 
their effect on the equilibrium price of domestic output. The second term 
picks up the impact on investment or "growth." Note that as credit market 
2
0 It should be emphasized, however, that this is in part due to our assumption 
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distortions become more severe,\Bd d Y' I dl- p] has a greater positive value, 
reflecting the welfare gain from additional investment.
2
1 The third term 
in (4.3) reflects the cost or benefit to households of increases in government 
spending. It is a property of quantity-constrained expenditure functions 
(see Neary and Roberts, 1980) that the partial derivative of the expenditure 
function with respect to the quantity-constraint, i.e. E , equals the prevail-
ing (disequilibrium) price of a good (G) whose supply to households is 
quantity-constrained minus its shadow value to households. In the 
present context where G and G' are public goods, the prevailing prices are 
zero, so £ and E , are just the negatives of the shadow values of publicly 
provided goods. The terms (/>+£) and (6^ + £ ,) are therefore equal to the 
social cost of public goods minus their social benefit. When the optimal 
level of government spending is chosen, of course, these terms equal zero. 
The fourth term reflects the potential benefit/cost of additional foreign 
borrowing (instead of taxation) as a means of financing government spend-
ing. Provided the real cost of foreign borrowing is less than the real deposit 
rate (n.b. not the real lending rate, which the government might [incorrectly] 
be using to decide where to borrow), p will be positive so that additional 
foreign borrowing raises national welfare. 
Scrutinizing (4.3), it becomes clear that it is generally impossible to 
resolve the con flict between policies that have favorable short-run impacts 
but unfavorable medium-term impacts (or vice versa) by calculating chan-
ges in national welfare using a utility index. The growth factor will receive 
very high incremental welfare weight in highly distorted economies, but 
it approaches zero as the credit market approaches complete effi-
ciency. The weight on the stabilization term depends on the responsive-
ness of current output to reductions in the real wage resulting from rising 
domestic prices (in an environment where nominal wages are sticky in the 
short-run). 
Thus, policy options 1, 2 and 3 have indeterminate welfare impacts, 
because their short and long-run consequences work in opposing directions 
(recall the results in Table 1). This is not the case, however, for options 4 and 
5. Option 4 -raising taxes while cutting monetary base creation- reduces 
welfare in the presence of credit rationing. In contrast, raising taxes while 
cutting government borrowing from the banking system (Option 5) unam-
biguously raises national welfare in the present model. 
2
1 Even in the absence of credit rationing, the existence of reserve requirements 
causes this expression to be positive. Unconstrained profit-maximization by borrowing 
firms implies that &dY'I dl -p-0. With reserve requirements, the deposit rate of 
interest will exceed the lending rate (i.e. 8 < 8 ), so 8/ Y'ldl-p>0. 48 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has developed a simple intertemporal optimization model with 
money and credit rationing to study the potential conflicts between short-
run output/employment effects and medium-run growth effects of 
various fiscal policy actions in LDCs. The conclusions from the compara-
tive static analysis, which is discussed in Section 3, were summarized in 
Table 1. It was shown that a temporary balanced-budget reduction in 
government spending stimulates growth via higher investment, but it 
does so at the cost of higher short-run unemployment. (Option 1 in the 
Table). Announcements of future spending cuts (Option 2), on the other 
hand, have the opposite effect. By increasing private wealth they stimulate 
consumption demand, thereby reducing the saving available to fund 
capital investment. 
If the government elects to postpone current expenditures until the 
future, rather than merely reducing them (Option 3), the short-run loss in 
output is more severe than it was under Option 1. On the other hand, the 
longer term growth impact via investment is more favorable. 
The analysis of tax increases (Options 4 and 5) shows that the short and 
medium-term effects of this deficit reducing policy depend critically on 
whether the government's reduced financing leads to a reduction in the rate 
ofr oney creation or government borrowing from the banking system. In the 
former case, the effects on both current output/employment and future 
output investment are unfavorable. In the latter, in contrast, both are 
favorable. In non-hyperinflationary environments, at least, this suggests 
that governments might focus on reducing its credit from the banking 
system as tax revenue increases. This "crowds in" private investment, 
thereby stimulating aggregate demand and reducing the policy's short-
run adjustment costs. Furthermore, the higher level of investment supports 
future output growth. 
Although the foregoing analysis suggests possible ways of designing 
"growth oriented" macroeconomic stabilization policies in developing 
countries, it remains to be seen how robust the conclusions are to alternative 
model specifications. Possible extensions include: i) allowing households to 
accumulate other assets besides bank account balances, ii) introducing 
"productive" government spending on public goods or infrastructure invest-
ments, and;'/'/') considering non-competitive banking systems and direct credit 
allocation programs that discriminate among various productive sectors of 
the economy. FISCAL DEFICIT RED' CTION PROGRAMS 49 
Appendix 1 
Technical Details of the Model 
The Wealth Expression 
Equation (1.12) claims that wealth in the present model can be written as: 
W = p(Y-G-l)+&d(Y'-G') + $F, (A.l) 
where p =p/p* -(p'l (1 + id)) ((1 + ;'*) /p"). This expression is used in cal-
culating comparative static results reported in the text. 
To derive (A.l), take the definition of wealth in (2.1) of the text: 
W=(pY-T) + (l + idY
x\p'Y'-Lp(\+i) + nB-T'] . (A.2) 
Using the government financing constraints (1.11) to eliminate T and 7", and 
the firms' financing constraint that (pl-Lp) = 0, (A.2) be rewritten as:. 
W = p(Y - G) -(pi-Lp) + Lg + H + F(p I p*> 
+ (1 + idr
l[p'(Y' - G') + nB- Lp(\ + i) -p'F(\ + i*) I p*'] 
= p(Y-I-G) + Sd (r- G') + B/
7 
+ {(Lp + Lg) + H + &d[nB - (Lp + Lg) (\ + i)]}. 
It can be shown that the terms in the brackets { ) equals zero. Substitute for 
7tB using (1.15) and use the banking sector's balance sheet constraint 
D = L
s + H and the market clearing condition thatZ/ = L + L The result is the 
household wealth constraint as written in (A.l). 
In the presence of credit rationing, investment is at the effective level 7 
defined by (1.9) in the text. In this case, the derivatives of wealth W equal: 
dW , dY' ,. 
^r = -p + >0 ; (A.3) 
dl '
 ddl 
di di 
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dW_ -p  
did (1 + id)
2 
2 (Y'-G')<0;  (A .5) 
dp
 ( )+dp
 + [dd¡
 P]dp 
(A .6) 
(A .6) is positive, provided that the welfare distortion reflected in the last term 
is less than the total amount of current output available for private consump-
tion, Y + IM-G-T>0. This is a weak assumption. 
The Slope of the GG Locus in Figure 2 
The GG locus in Figure 2 denotes goods market equilibrium. It is defined by 
(2.4) after substituting for wealth using (2.5). The slope of GG is unambiguous-
ly positive:
2
2 
Intuitively,increasesin7raiseaggregatedemand,bothdirectlyand indirectly 
via the induced positive wealth effect on consumption. Hence increases in 7 
must be accompanied by increases in p ceteris paribus to maintain goods 
market equilibrium. GG indeed has a positive slope. 
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